Western University

Scholarship@Western
MPA Major Research Papers

Local Government Program

7-1-2012

Involuntary Resettlement in Hydroelectric
Projects: A Comparison of Chinese and Canadian
Case Studies and Implications for Best Practice
Qian Liao
Western University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lgp-mrps
Part of the Public Administration Commons
Recommended Citation
Liao, Qian, "Involuntary Resettlement in Hydroelectric Projects: A Comparison of Chinese and Canadian Case Studies and
Implications for Best Practice" (2012). MPA Major Research Papers. 109.
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/lgp-mrps/109

This Major Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Local Government Program at Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted
for inclusion in MPA Major Research Papers by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact
tadam@uwo.ca, wlswadmin@uwo.ca.

1

Involuntary Resettlement in Hydroelectric Projects:
A Comparison of Chinese and Canadian case studies
and implications for best practice

MPA Research Report

Submitted to

The Local Government Program
Department of Political Science
The University of Western Ontario

Qian Liao
July 2012

Involuntary Resettlement in Hydroelectric Projects:

2

A Comparison of Chinese and Canadian case studies
and implications for best practice

Abstract

This paper attempts to compare different political systems with respect to similar

issues, in this case, the involuntary resettlement induced by the construction of large
dams. It aims to examine real world cases from both China and Canada, namely the
Three Georges Dam, and a series of dams being built in James Bay in Quebec
regarding the involuntary resettlement issue. By looking at the practices of both
hydroelectric projects in this regard, the role of government in this process and their
impact on the affected communities and the society as a whole, this paper seeks to
explore the characteristics of both cases from the perspective of political science in an
attempt to analyze those practices and the problems that occurred under each system.
By comparing the differences of both China’s case and Canada’s case, the rationales
will be presented as to why there are differences or similarities found in quite different
political and social contexts. Based on previous studies and analysis, several political
factors stand out as the main contributing factors in shaping the resettlement process in
China, namely the land ownership system, center-local governmental relationships;
accountability structures and preference for urban-industrial development over ruralagricultural development. Aside from that, it’s fascinating to find that even in different
political systems, some similarities can still be found when dealing with similar issues. In
this case, due to the nature of the issue and the similar characteristics of targeted
population, similar effects are found as a result of the involuntary resettlements. At the
end of the paper, some insights and recommendations will be provided and conclusions
will be made as to what can be learned from each other in dealing with similar issues in
the future through a political lens.
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Resettlement has never failed to gain great attention as well as to provoke
worldwide debate both in the academic field and in real world practice in the issue of
development due to its highly controversial nature and the adverse long-term social and
environmental costs of large development projects (Asthana, 1996; Cernea &
Guggenheim, 1993; Cernea, 1988, etc.). The nature of development projects is
economic-driven. The problem resulting from this kind of projects lies in its social impact,
such as involuntary resettlement. People who are affected by development projects must
move to places regardless of their willingness. In most cases, they are reluctant or even
resistant to such relocation. From an ethical perspective, involuntary resettlement is the
most debatable, or even unacceptable issue involved in launching this kind of project.
Those who oppose those projects always consider it to be inhumane and against human
rights. People displaced by dams and reservoirs are considered a consequence of
development (Cernea, 1990; Scudder & Colson, 1982). Each year, 10 million people
worldwide are resettled to make way for infrastructure projects such as dams, airports,
highways 1 (Cernea, 1997; World Bank on Dams, 1996). Development projects causing
resettlement, however, are seen to fit into the nation's ideology and the larger social
good (Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993).

Development Projects and Resettlement
Consequently, there has been a huge pool of academic studies in the field of
resettlement or relocation as a result of development projects since the 1980s (Asthana,
1996; Barnett & Webber, 2010; Cernea & Guggenheim, 1993; Croll, 1999; Escobar,
2003; Feldman, Geisler, & Silberling, 2003; Forsyth, 2003; Hirsch & Warren, 1998;

Of these 10 million, large dams account for 4 million displaced people. (Dwivedic,
1999)

1
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Oliver-Smith, 2006; Scudder & Colson, 1982, etc.). In particular, resettlement caused by
the building of dams draws the most attention. Quite a few of them have focused on the
adverse social and environmental impact relocation has imposed upon the affected
communities and the society as a whole. Aside from academics, NGOs (World Bank,
International Finance Corporation, World Mission on Dams, local interest groups, etc.)
are also playing a big part in contributing to research in this field. The World Bank in
2004 has already published a guidance book on the planning and implementation of
involuntary resettlement (World Bank, 2004). The release of the World Commission on
Dams (WCD) Report (2000) more than a decade ago has also provoked much esteem,
controversy, and discussion .The WCD Report provided a comprehensive overview of
the impacts of large dams around the world. It recommended a new approach to
decision-making based on universally agreed values and strategic priorities (equity,
sustainability, efficiency, participatory decision-making, and accountability). Besides, it

also presented a framework for decision-making process which includes seven strategic
priorities and 26 guidelines for governments, donors, policymakers, planners, and dam
builders that would involve in the dam building process. This separates relocation from
other political issues that mainly draws attention within the political domain. Yet,
development can be voluntary and involuntary. It’s important to distinguish the two.
Anthropologists use 'push' and 'pull' factors to describe involuntary and voluntary
migration. Voluntary resettlement refers to attracting people to new places, whereas
involuntary resettlement means forcing people out of their traditional localities. The
difference between involuntary and voluntary population movements is that the former
are caused by 'push' factors only. 'Pull' factors, if any, are the exception rather than the
rule (Asthana, 1996; Guggenheim & Cernea, 1993). Distinguishing involuntary
resettlement and voluntary resettlement helps enhancing the understanding of the
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essence of involuntary resettlement. Besides, depending on geographical context, there
can be resettlement that is from urban to urban, from rural to rural, and from rural to
urban. In addition, resettlement can take place in democratic societies and nondemocracies, although a lot of the researchers are looking at resettlement in developing
countries. All these different forms and circumstances have added dynamics and

complexities to this issue. This paper attempts to compare different political systems with
respect to similar issues, in this case, the involuntary resettlement induced by the
construction of large dams. It aims to examine real world cases from both China and
Canada, namely the Three Georges Dam, and a series of dams being built in James
Bay in Quebec regarding the involuntary resettlement issue. By looking at the practices
of both hydroelectric projects in this regard, the role of government in this process and
their impact on the affected communities and the society as a whole, this paper seeks to
explore the characteristics of both cases from the perspective of political science in an
attempt to analyze those practices and the problems that occurred under each system.
By comparing the differences of both China’s case and Canada’s case, the rationales
will be presented as to why there are differences or similarities found in quite different
political and social contexts. Based on previous studies and analysis, several political
factors stand out as the main contributing factors in shaping the resettlement process in
China, namely the land ownership system, center-local governmental relationships;
accountability structures and preference for urban-industrial development over ruralagricultural development. Aside from that, it’s fascinating to find that even in different
political systems, some similarities can still be found when dealing with similar issues. In
this case, due to the nature of the issue and the similar characteristics of targeted
population, similar effects are found as a result of the involuntary resettlements. At the
end of the paper, some insights and recommendations will be provided and conclusions
will be made as to what can be learned from each other in dealing with similar issues in

the future through a political lens.
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Pros and Cons of the construction of large dams
Having said that, this paper will only focus on involuntary resettlement that takes
place in different political and social contexts, particularly dam-induced involuntary
resettlement. Most of the existing literature about hydropower projects, especially large
ones, has focused on issues around their impacts upon social, cultural and economic
aspects. The justifications of building dams are usually around its economic benefits the
affected communities will gain. However, the pros and cons of building development
projects are both quite obvious. Over the past decades, there has been on-going debate
around the issues of large-dam construction regarding the nature and magnitude of
environmental and socioeconomic damage of hydro development. There is both criticism
as well as support. Advocates, mostly developers and politicians of hydro development
always argue that hydro power is environmentally positive compared to other sources of
energy to justify their deeds. They claim that unlike coal, or other natural resources,
dams don’t produce greenhouse emissions, acid rain, or urban smog, or other waste that
could harm our offspring, which is renewable and sustainable in the long run. They
produce way fewer GHG and no other air pollutants, much lower than those generated
by fossil fuel electricity- “approximately 60 times less than coal-fired power plants and 20
times less than the least carbon intensive of the thermal generation options” (Canadian
Hydropower Association Report, 2002; Martin & Hoffman, 2008).
However, that’s only half the story. Those (mainly NGOs and affected groups,
environmentalists and anthropologists) who strongly object to the development of
hydroelectricity argue that actually reservoirs do emit greenhouse gases due to the
rotting of organic matter, including submerged vegetation and soils and the detritus that

flows into the reservoir from upstream (Martin & Hoffman, 2008). Not only does hydro
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electricity cause a different type of global climate change crisis by changing the existing
ecology but what’s worse, it has put our environment in danger by contaminating water
and killing trees and animals. Lost forest land and serious harm to the aquatic
environment (Martin & Hoffman, 2008). According to Martin and Hoffman (2008), hydro
construction throughout Manitoba has resulted in the flooding of some 600,000 acres.
Aside from that, advocates fail to recognize the devastating social and
environmental consequences felt by affected population brought in by hydro projects, as
addressed by people who are against hydro projects. These projects are ecologically,
socially and morally catastrophic for affected population and the whole society, one of
which is involuntary resettlement and its interaction with its social effects.
For countries lacking electricity and power, hydropower projects are absolutely
lifesavers. That’s one of the reasons for most developing countries, like China to build
Three Georges Dam since it generates huge amounts of electricity to relieve the
pressure caused by shortages. Groundbreaking achievements have also been made in
related areas like electronics, metallurgy, engineering, and myriad other scientific fields,
as well as the development of complex organizational and managerial systems, which
revolutionized the electrical system, required by the generation, transmission and
distribution of electrical system. As a result, hydro companies made great strides in
expanding their markets (Martin & Hoffman, 2008). Their incentive for the construction of
dams is to export their product. In this revolution, there are benefits as well as costs. The
winners are the consumers of some of the cheapest power. For example, In Canada, the
case of Manitoba, as the North America, namely the residents of southern Manitoba and
the American upper Midwest. The losers or the victims have been Manitoba’s Aboriginal
communities (Martin & Hoffman, 2008). However, to fully assess hydro development,

both its economic and social effects should be taken into account.
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Involuntary Resettlement caused by Large Dams
Large dams have been an important component of infrastructure development in
both developing and developed countries alike. Consequently, it is estimated that the
construction of large dams has displaced 40 to 80 million of the world’s people, mostly in
developing countries like China, India and Brazil (World Commission on Dams, 2000). In
particular, since 1949, between 18.5 and 20 million people were displaced by
development projects in India and about 45.1 million in China (Brook, Michael & Duan,
2008; Fruggle, Smith, Hydrosult, & Agrodev, 2000). The 1980s has been called by some
as the "decade of displacement" (Asthana, 1996). “Involuntary resettlement—
Resettlement is involuntary when it occurs without the informed consent of the displaced
persons or if they give their consent without having the power to refuse resettlement.”
(International Finance Corporation, 2012). It refers to the permanent forced relocation of
entire households (Croll, 1999; Feldman, Geisler, & Silberling, 2003). Barnett and
Webber (2010) argue that it’s a special form of migration yet it bears the same
characteristic that like many migrations, it is both cause and consequence of socially
engineered environmental change. The involuntary nature of the migration and
resettlement process involves an almost total loss of control over both choices and
resources (Oliver-Smith, 1991). Involuntary resettlement consists of two closely related
yet distinct processes: displacing people and rebuilding their livelihoods (Asthana, 1996),
which are both significant in minimizing and avoiding the adverse impact the process
would impose on relocatees. The characteristics of involuntary relocations are (Li, Waley
& Rees, 2001): they are forced to move against their wills. Since they have no other
realistic choice but to move; they are usually planned and carried out by governments;
and they will be leaving their original living places permanently since their home will be

inundated. Thus, involuntary resettlement has devastating effects upon affected

10

population. At first, one might have a little doubt as to the existence of involuntary
resettlement in democracies. By this definition, involuntary resettlement can take place
anywhere regardless of political systems and social contexts. In democratic societies
most issues are dealt through negotiation. However, due to specific contexts and
information asymmetry between two sides, some of the negotiation process is somewhat
symbolic, which can hardly make the process just and fair.
Existing literature mainly focused on the relocation policies and measures,
effects of involuntary resettlement and ways to ameliorate the negative consequences of
forcible relocation (Asthana, 1996; Cernea, 1988, 1997; Cernea & Kanbur, 2002; Croll,
1999; Oliver-Smith, 1991; Wilmsen, Webber, & Duan, 2011; etc). Cernea (1988) has
concluded that involuntary resettlement would lead to the impoverishment of affected
communities. He (1997) also argued that the documented relocation outcomes have
been overwhelmingly negative. Main Theories on involuntary resettlement include
Scudder-Colson relocation theory (1982) and “risk model” developed by Cernea (1990),
which has great influence on the theories and practices in this field. According to
Scudder and Colson (1982), there are four stages involved in the process of involuntary
resettlement from the perspective of affected people. It begins with relocation, which
means the physical replacement. The second stage involves adjustment to new
environment, during which relocated people suffer from both emotional and economic
stress of readjustment. A lot of them end up with lower incomes and worse standards of
living due to replacement. Besides, because most people usually stop making
investment once they know they have to move somewhere else, by the time of
relocation, their income and the value of their assets get lower than before. Resettlement
enters the third stage if economic development and community formation occur, which

Scudder notes that most cases do not reach the third stage. The fourth stage
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consolidates.
Cernea (1990) developed a “risk model”, where he points out that when
displacement and relocation leave people worse off, the empirical evidence reveals a set
of eight recurrent characteristics that need to be monitored closely. They all contribute to
a process of impoverishment. Thus, the "risks to be avoided" in displacement are:(i)
landlessness;(ii) joblessness; (iii) homelessness; (iv) marginalisation;
(v)morbidity;(vi)food insecurity;(vii)loss of access to common property assets; and (viii)
social disarticulation. Those eight aspects together contribute to the impoverishment of
affected population in general. Both the Scudder-Colson theory and Cernea’s “risk
model” have demonstrated the negative impact of relocation on the affected population.
In general, this literature showed that displacement not only resulted in asset and
job loss but also in the breakdown of social and food security, credit and labor exchange
networks, social capital and kinship ties. Other effects of involuntary resettlement include
the social-political disempowerment of the affected people, loss of cultural identity and
heritage as well as impoverishment (Baviskar, 1995).

Past Experiences
Based on past experiences, we know that relocation is just one item of the whole
package in the resettlement process. Job training, employment and business
opportunities are also important aspects that should be taken into account to make the
resettlement process more sustainable for relocatees. Besides, the complexity and
difficulty of involuntary resettlement results not from the number of people affected
alone, but from the severity of the consequences to the affected people. Since it requires
systematic planning and sophisticated political skills to ensure the resettlement process
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is as harmless as possible, planning is significant in ensuring a successful resettlement.
Oliver-Smith (1991) addressed the importance of planning in resettlement. He further
argued that “an ill-considered or hastily drawn up resettlement plan which does not
attend to such crucial factors as land availability, water resources, soil fertility, plant and
animal resources, employment opportunities, local housing and settlement patterns,

inter-ethnic relations, physical security, leadership and local authority institutions among
other dimensions will be likewise unconvincing”. This statement literally covers all the
important factors that the policy decision-makers should take into account when planning
and implementing resettlement policies. It also reflects the complexities of the
resettlement issue. Public acceptance of key decisions is another essential factor for
equitable and sustainable water and energy resources development. Acceptance
emerges from recognising rights, addressing risks, and safeguarding the entitlements of
all groups of affected people, particularly indigenous and tribal peoples, women,
peasants and other vulnerable groups (World Commission on Dams, 2000). This means
a high level of public participation should be involved in the decision making process.
Besides, communication and education play a significant role in negotiating with and
informing the affected population from past experiences (Oliver-Smith, 1991). Even if the
process is more of an informing one, sufficient information is also necessary and
facilitates the implementation process. People are most afraid of the unknown, to
educate them on dams so as to lessen their anxiety and reluctance to hydroelectric
projects. It would be helpful for the implementation and operation of the projects on
condition that their voice, perspectives, concerns and expectations to be heard by the
government. Ideally, one would advocate relocating residents into a permanent
settlement and more fully integrating them into modernity as well as maintaining their
traditional lifestyle and culture, creating a win-win situation in which nobody has to
compromise any part of their interests. But realistically, that’s usually not the case.

Dam-induced Involuntary Resettlement in China

13

History of Dam building and resettlement issue in China
China has a long history of construction of hydroelectric projects. The earliest
recorded dam, known as Dujiangyan, can be dated back as long as two thousand years
ago. It is located in the southwest part of China and was originally built to fight against
flood and later as an irrigation system. It is still in use today, serving as an irrigation
system and a popular tourist spot attracting people from all over the world. Recent
history saw few hydrostations being constructed until 1949. Since the foundation of
People’s Republic of China in 1949, dam building in China has accelerated (Wilmsen,
2011). The period between 1949-1985 is a heyday of dam construction, which saw a
number of over 70,000 hydrostations and as many as 80,000 reservoirs on behalf of
hydroelectricity, irrigation and flood control (Jing, 1999; Wilmsen, 2011). During this
period, dam construction was mainly controlled and financed by the central government.
Currently, China is the largest producer of hydroelectricity in the world. It is estimated
that over 10.2 million people in China have been uprooted as a result dam building (Jing,
1999). Such large scale of construction caused a dramatic increase in involuntary
resettlement, the scale of which has been unmatched by any country in the last 50 years
(World Commission on Dams, 2000).
Past practices and approaches of Chinese government toward resettlement have
not been highly praised but rather strongly criticized by both domestic and foreign
scholars and media. Those activities were considered inhumane and against the
international norms. Under the Great Leap Forward, the central government dislocated
more than 1 million people (Jing, 1999). Due to a lack of comprehensive framework of
resettlement policies and mismanagement, the process of resettlement has been painful
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and exceptionally hard for both government and the relocatees. Yet the outcomes were
devastating and controversial. The characteristics of those resettlement program
launched by governments prior to 1980s were coercion, suppression and neglect (Jing,

1999). Activist Dai Qing claimed that there are no cases of successful implementation of
involuntary resettlement in China (Dai, 1994). Woodman states that the practice of
resettlement in China is more a model of control over information than of good practice
(Woodman, 2000). Indeed, Stein (1998) “observes that involuntary resettlement in China
all too frequently implies the abandonment of those displaced to conditions of chronic
impoverishment”. Chau (1995) estimates that 30 per cent of China’s involuntary
resettlements have failed. According to previous research, since 1949 displacees in
China have faced adversities similar to those faced by displacees of other developing
nations (Wilmsen, 2011). They were considered as the victims of economic development
and modernization. Needless to say, resettlement programs were mostly considered to
have failed, or at least considered to be highly controversial during this period.
However, over the last 50 years there has also been continuous improvement in
the policies and procedures that address dam-induced displacement and resettlement in
China. Among those efforts, continued improvement of policy at national level, especially
compensation standards, is a significant one (World Commission on Dams, 2000).
Besides recognizing the human and financial costs of substandard resettlement planning
and practice, the Chinese government has endeavored to improve its approaches with
respect to the resettlement issue (Nui, 2004). It gradually recognized that resettlements
could be seen as a chance of developing the affected areas. The concept of
resettlement with development has fundamentally changed the traditional approach of
addressing resettlement, which is compensation-based resettlement (Brook, et al, 2008).

A Case Study of Involuntary Resettlement of Three Gorges Dam Project
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Introduction of Three Gorges Dam project
Three Gorges Dam is a reservoir as long as 632 km, situated at Sandouping,
Yichang, Hubei Province. The construction of the dam began in 1994. It was expected to
be completed in 2009. The project is composed of the dam, two power plants and
navigation facilities (Wang, 2002). It’s estimated that some 20 counties or municipal
districts, 227 townships and 1680 villages have been inundated (Duan & Steil, 2003) as
well as 23 800 ha of farmland (Chi, 1997). However, according to the government (Jing,
1999), the project has the capacity of producing 84.7 billion kWh of hydroelectricity
annually, which helps alleviate the problem of electricity shortage due to increasing
demand in middle and eastern China. Aside from that, it improves the navigation
capacity of Yangtze River and the ecological environment by providing clean energy and
thus reducing the Co2 intensity of GDP at the same time.
The Three Gorges dam has received great attention ever since. Proposed by
Sun Yat-sen in 1919, it became one of the most hotly debated political issues within the
Chinese government due to its unprecedented scale and social and environmental
impacts. Scholars criticize its profound adverse social and environmental impacts and
strongly oppose this project. Some claim it’s the demonstration the Chinese government
has showed to the world what they can achieve. More importantly, they argue that
institutional desires for political and economic gain have always played a special role in
the project (Jing, 1999). The political aspect has always been a significant characteristic
of this project. Prior to its approval by the National People’s Congress in 1992, scholars
also questioned the feasibility of this mega-project and the management skill of Chinese
government in handling this kind of issue since past experiences have been painful and
unsuccessful. As a result, it remains one of the most controversial water conservancy

projects ever constructed (Down to Earth, 1994; Human Rights in China, 1998;
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International Rivers Network, 2003). Among all the criticism and controversies, the
resettlement program is a frequently debated topic.

Resettlement Program
The resettlement of the Three Gorges dam project is not an overnight process.
Instead, it has lasted for nearly two decades and is still in process up to day. The first
phase of population resettlement started in 1993. Between 1993 and 1995, some
thousands of people were displaced (Jing, 1999; Wilmsen, et al, 2011). Another 20,000plus people were relocated in 1996, and more than 30,000 are being resettled before the
damming of the river in November (Jing, 1999). As time goes by, more and more people
were displaced. In 2003, most of the large-scale resettlement began, after the
completion of the first group of electric generating units. By 2009, 13 cities, 140 towns
and 1,352 villages will be flooded, and at least 1.2 million people will be relocated (Jing,
1999). Never before in China, or anywhere else for that matter, has a single
hydroelectric dam project displaced so many people (Jing, 1999). The majority of the
displaced people were from small rural communities. Heggelund (2004) claimed that
more than 87% were classified as rural residents. In other words, most of them are
peasants who rely heavily or even solely on their lands and communities as a way of
living. They are considered the vulnerable group in Chinese society. The official data of
people resettled is 1.13 million (Jing, 1999). But the actual number of population being
resettled is between 1.3 million to1.6 million. The displacement cost approximately 40%
of the officially estimated project investment of RMB 180 billion ($28 billion) in 2008
prices (Wang, 2002; Wilmsen, et al, 2011). The scale of relocation for Three Gorges
Dam project is unprecedented.
Findings of current literature overwhelmingly suggest that involuntary

resettlement is associated with the impoverishment of the affected population and the
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destruction of the social fabric (Cernea, 1990, 1997, 1998; Scudder, 1997; Scudder, &
Colson, 1982; etc.). Similar to the impacts of most other resettlement programs, the
overall adverse impact of the resettlement imposed upon affected population in Three
Gorges Dam resettlement is that they were considerably poorer afterwards and worse
off than their neighbours who were not moved (Jing, 1999) since they suffered from
asset, income and land loss (Brook, et al, 2008; Wilmsen, et al, 2011) as well as
psychological stress (Xi & Hwang, 2011).

Political principles, Major Policies and Approaches of Resettlement
Resettlement for the Three Gorges Dam Project is the most difﬁcult task of all the
projects involved for Chinese government. Unlike most developing countries, the
People’s Republic of China established a fairly comprehensive legal framework and a
variety of regulations to support involuntary resettlement some decades ago and made
modifications over time (Brook, et al, 2008; World Bank, 2000), from pre-feasibility
planning, developing the Feasibility Resettlement Program, implementing the plan and
monitoring the entire process.
Since the mid-1980s, the Chinese government has carried out a ‘developmentoriented resettlement’ policy, linking resettlement to development in order to prevent the
impoverishment that has been typical of past large hydro projects. As Croll (1999)
pointed out that the with the introduction of "resettlement with development" or
"development-oriented resettlement," the process of resettlement not only relocates
people, but also helps them by providing the means of production to generate improved
incomes. In China, it puts forth the generic objective of resettlement in the slogan
‘moving out, being stable and becoming wealthy gradually’ (Bryan, Hugo & Tan, 2005). It
is said to have been designed to guarantee a package of economic benefits to the
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targeted rural resettlers, including establishment of housing projects, production bases
and an infrastructure of community facilities (Jing, 1997). Under this principle, the
relative policies cover areas of support, including employment and production
development, funding development, preferential treatment for resettlers, and postresettlement activities (Wilmsen, 2011). The principle is to take resettlement as a

chance for development and improvement, or at least to restore the pre-relocation living
standard of resettled people. This policy of “near resettlement” is another approach that
the Chinese government has taken at the initial stage of the project, meaning to displace
people to a higher level or further from the reservoir. However, in 1998, the central
government realized that the deteriorating environment in the upper reaches of the
Yangtze River was a significant factor causing disastrous floods and that clearing of the
reservoir areas for displaced people must be restrained (Bryan, et al, 2005).
Specifically, resettlement planning for each county includes the following main
elements: ‘planning for rural displaced people; relocation planning of cities and towns;
inundation treatment and relocation for enterprises; special item reconstruction planning;
environmental protection planning and cost-estimation. In resettlement planning, the
relationship between resettlement and economic development has been fully reconciled
and environmental protection is also given special consideration’ (Wang, 2002).
Among all the policies, those around compensation are an important aspect in
the resettlement issue that needs to be addressed since adequate compensation is
crucial to rural relocated population who rely on agricultural production to make a living.
The Land Administration Law, first formulated in 1953, outlined the principles and
procedures for land acquisition (Wilmsen, 2011). It also set the standards for payment of
compensation for acquired land, which set the foundation for compensation standard for
resettlement and land acquisition. It has been updated and improved five times with
additional regulations added to enhance the land law including the Land Acquisition and

Resettlement Regulation for the Construction of Large and Medium-Sized Water
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Conservancy Projects (1991 and 2006) (Shi, 2008; Wilmsen, 2011). Under the most
recent Land Administration Law (2004) (Article 51) (Wilmsen, 2011), when land or
housing is acquired to make way for a large or medium-sized dam, the standards for
land compensation and the method of resettlement shall be determined separately by
the State Council. In this case, the affected population fall under the Land Acquisition
and Resettlement Regulation for Construction of Large and Medium-sized Water
Conservancy Projects (Wilmsen, 2011). The regulation was first issued in 1991 and
modified in 2006. According to the 1991 Regulations, compensation was calculated by
determining the average annual output value (AAOV) for three years prior to the land
acquisitioning and multiplying it by a factor of three or four. Land compensation and
resettlement subsidies are equal to 16 times the average annual output value under the
2006 regulation (Wilmsen, 2011). Besides, the 2006 Regulations added subsidies for
relocation and training for livelihoods, annual post-relocation fund support of RMB 600
per year per capita for 20 years, and community infrastructure rehabilitation and
improvement based on the needs of resettlers (Asian Development Bank, 2007).
Other preferential policies have also been formulated by the State Council in
order to facilitate the resettlement program. The investment needed for resettlement is
ensured. There are abundant natural resources, such as minerals, hydraulic resources,
forests, agricultural products and tourist resources in the region offering favourable
conditions for development (Wang, 2002).
Other policies include: approving preferential policies such as those given to
special economic (zones) for the reservoir region’s area and cities; providing low interest
loans for technical reforms to the relocation enterprises; and resolving that the whole
country should support the resettlement of (those displaced by) TGP (Wang, 2002).

Political Factors that influence the Resettlement Process
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China’s resettlement process has its particular characteristics due to its unique
political system and historical legacy. The first factor that separates the resettlement
process from other cases is the land ownership. China has a dual land ownership
system. In urban areas, land is owned by the state. Urban dwellers can trade their landuse rights under a leasehold system through selling in the market, subleasing, or
mortgaging the land (Po, 2008; Deng & Huang, 2004). However, in rural China, land is
owned collectively, meaning that it’s not owned individually but communally (usually at
the village level). Rural residents are entitled to use the lands but they are not allowed to
sell their land in the market (Bryan, et al, 2005; Wilmsen, 2011). In rural areas, when
land acquisition occurs, it is a transfer of land ownership from the rural collective to the
state or under the institutional power of the local government. However, this enables
local government to expropriate land from peasants at low cost and sell it to developers
at much higher prices (Ding, 2007; Yang & Wang, 2008). Besides, when households are
dispossessed of their land, they are compensated not for the value of land but for the
loss of use value of their land. Therefore, compensation can hardly reflect their price of
land in its developed use (Wilmsen, et al, 2011; Ding, 2007; Edin, 2003). That’s one of
the reasons the compensation standards are still considered too low to resettlers (Asian
Development Bank, 2007) even after 2006, when the updated regulations have taken
the compensation standards to a historically new level.
Central-local governmental relations are another factor that influences the
practice of resettlement. China is a unitary state and its bureaucracy is hierarchical but
devolved. Laws, decrees, regulations and decisions flow down from the central
government in Beijing to officials in provinces, prefectures, counties, and townships. But
local officials are embedded in a local bureaucracy: they have dual responsibilities (and,

often, dual funding too)—to their superiors within a ministry as well as to the local
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government in which they are embedded (Wilmsen, et al, 2011). In some sense,
government is localized because local governments are responsible for the
implementation of all the policies that come down from the central government. This can
give local governments a great deal of autonomy if the local economy is successful and
strong, resulting in loose execution of policies at the local government. Thus, in this
case, the central regulations can be loosely implemented at local government level as
well. Under the resettlement policies, resettlement is managed by local governments and
is supported by the whole nation. The hierarchy of resettlement administration for large
dam project is illustrated in figure 1 (Wilmsen, 2011). In general, the administration and
implementation of resettlement policies can be very decentralized. Local government
can tailor resettlement plans and policies to specific local environment and situations,
thus having a great deal of autonomy. However, the devolution of power to local
government is not accompanied by the introduction of systems to monitor and detect the
implementation of the resettlement policies (Andrews-Speed & Ma, 2008).
A preference for urban and industrial forms of development over rural and
agricultural forms of development is another contributing factor that makes the practice
of China’s resettlement experience unique (Peet & Hartwick, 1999; Wilmsen, et al,
2011). Since 1978, China’s national objective is economic development while
maintaining social stability and retaining existing power structures (Edin, 2003). China’s
modernization is characterized by an absolute preference for urban and industrial
development. There is huge difference between the rural and urban systems. One
example is the different citizenship systems. In rural area, people hold rural hukou
(household registration system), whereas urban residents hold non-rural hukou. People
holding different kinds of hukou enjoy different levels of social services, such as health
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and education. For a long time, this system has been a big obstacle for rural residents to
become better off.

Fig. 1 Hierarchical Structure of Resettlement Administration for Dam Projects
Rural residents suffer from generational poverty. Besides, city development and
modernization have always been national priorities, leaving rural areas extremely
backward and poor. Although great efforts have been made to improve rural people’s life
and to develop rural areas, when government realized that the gap between urban and
rural has been getting increasingly huge, little progress has been made. These political
attitudes and social contexts indicate that peasants should give way to the needs of
development and modernization. They should do what they have been told and
informed.
Accountability structures also stands out as an important aspect of Chinese

policies and practices. As discussed earlier, the governance of projects in China is
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hierarchical. At each administrative level, regardless of whether a project is nationally
funded or whether it involves international donors, the lowest level of the hierarchy is
always held accountable to the next highest level of administration. In other words, they
are accountable to the higher level of the administration. In the Three Gorges Dam
resettlement case, those who are responsible for implementing the national resettlement
policy and associated regulations view themselves as accountable to the next level of
government rather than the affected population. Undoubtedly, this has profound
influence on the outcomes of resettlement project.

Achievements and major problems
The resettlement project of Three Gorges Dam is a mega-project itself. By the
time of writing, it has been going for almost twenty years and has involved a number of
over 1.3 million population resettled. Although there has been criticism and controversies
towards the approaches, policies and practices of resettlement, one has to admit that
there are achievements as well. Unlike many developing countries, China has a welldeveloped framework of legislation supporting dam-forced displacement and
resettlement (Wilmsen, 2011). During the resettlement period, there has been no big
social disturbance. Relocation work has been fairly smoothly implemented under the
resettlement planning. The infrastructure for relocated cities and towns also has
progressed (Wang, 2002). The mission of resettlement is also roughly achieved.
However, these achievements can not overshadow the problems of resettlement
program that have been broadly addressed.
To begin with, the compensation issue in resettlement has always been highly
controversial. Generally speaking, compensation lacks consistency across provinces
and counties, which leads to injustice and anger among resettlers. Specifically, there are

mainly three problems in the compensation issue alone. First is the overall low level of
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compensation the government has provided to resettled people. As discussed before,
the land is owned collectively in rural China. The compensation system reflected the
land ownership system in China. Compensation was paid for the use value of land rather
the value of land. Therefore, peasants do not receive compensation for the loss of land,
because the land was not theirs in the first place. Local governments have substantial
power in deciding the use value of the land and the value can be variable. Secondly, as
abovementioned, the majority of resettled population have been rural residents. But a
few of them are urban residents. Under the government's current resettlement policy, the
rural people are to be compensated less than these urbanites. The disparity in
compensation payments between rural and urban residents fueled great conflicts.
Besides, within rural areas, there can be huge gaps with respect to compensation
packages. Compensation was determined by county governments, who are entitled to
assess the value of old houses and there’s no standard compensation that’s being used
across all the affected communities, which led to the big gap between communities in
terms of compensation. This reflects China’s political system. Since power is devolved
from center to locality within China’s system of governance, county governments have a
lot of autonomy with respect to compensation within their own jurisdictions when the
policies and regulations come down from central government. As a result, different
jurisdictions can have fairly different levels of compensation given the specific situations
they face (Brook, et al, 2008; Wilmsen, 2011). This is a contributing factor that caused
households to lose assets and become worse off post relocation.
Lack of participation of affected people is another problem that has been
frequently criticized among critics and media (World Bank, 2000). The Chinese
government has been “accused” of using an inhumane approach of persuading people

to get out of their houses and move to somewhere they don’t know, mostly in a way of
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coercion and informing instead of consultation (Heggelund, 2004; Jing, 1999; Tan, 2008;
etc.). Peasants don’t really have a say in the resettlement process regarding
resettlement locations and livelihood options. Mostly, they are informed about what they
have to do. Legally speaking, public participation is not the mandate of Chinese
government since it’s not stipulated in the 2006 Regulations. Peasants are prevented
from negotiating (Cao, Feng & Tao, 2008). This is also rooted back to China’s unique
political atmosphere and historical legacy addressed above. China’s preference for
urban and industrial forms of development over rural and agricultural forms of
development indicate that peasants should give way to the needs of national priorities
for development and modernization. The fundamental nature of this kind of program is
that the few give rights away for the benefit of the many (Wilmsen, 2011). They should
do what they have been told and informed. Besides, since peasants are historically not a
well-educated group in China, their input was not taken seriously and it’s considered to
be a waste of time to get them involved in an already demanding task. For example, at
one village in Kaixian County, Chongqing Municipality, displacees were invited to
‘participate in propaganda’ organized by the township resettlement office (Deng &
Huang, 2004). At the meeting they were ‘lectured on the significance of the Three
Gorges Project’, compensation standards, and the opportunities for livelihood
development (Deng & Huang, 2004). This kind of consultation mainly takes the form of
providing information. Another contributing factor that leads to poor implementation and
outcomes of the resettlement policies is the accountability structures discussed earlier.
One of the most common results of the earlier mentioned accountability structures is the
asymmetrical relationships of power between the government officials and the affected
population. In this case, what’s even worse is that the affected population are mostly
vulnerable groups that usually acquire limited social resources. Vulnerable groups were

not paid as much attention as they should have been paid. Since administrations
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responsible for implementing the resettlement policies and regulations are held
accountable to the next level of government rather than the resettled people, local
governments lack the incentive to consult the needs and demands of affected people.
Other problems cited by scholars include: the underestimation of the number of
relocated population; poor selection of designated resettlement in the early stage of
resettlement that lead to “secondary resettlement”; lack of detailed planning of
resettlement, including analysis of land availability and carrying capacity (Bryan, et al,
2005; World Bank, 2000); corruption problems of local government (Ting, 1997; Wu,
1998); insufficient attention to vulnerable groups, including women, ethnic minorities
(Bryan, et al, 2005; World Bank, 2000); mismanagement of resettlement budget and
time lag (Jing, 1999; World Bank, 2000); and the lack of a monitoring mechanism for the
resettlement process 2. Those problems are all micro-problems that resulted from the
political characteristics of the Chinese government. “Micro” doesn’t mean they aren’t
worth addressing, but rather those problems are of great significance that should be
dealt with in order to improve the outcome of resettlement program. For example, the
problem of corruption has caused public anger and is always worth our close attention.
However, what I’m trying to address here is that those problems are of managerial
nature and some of them are the result of the Chinese political system. In order to
address the latter problems, radical reform should be made.
Above all, China’s experience reflected the national objective during this time.
The resettlement is a mirror that tells us the national priorities. Specifically, it indicated
2

In 1995, the Communist Party officially introduced Xinfang, a creative complaint system
compared to traditional formal legal institutions. It has served as a channel for citizens to
seek assistance, to appeal government decisions, and to engage in a limited level of

political participation (Minzner, 2009).

that during those periods the country has been focusing on economic growth in the
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context of the subordination of individuals to the collective and the few to the most;
preference of urban-industrial development over rural development; disparities between
urban and rural; the local implementation of national plans and directives; and the
structure of land ownership, which have all shaped its story and made it unique.

Dam-induced Resettlement in Canada
History of Dam building and resettlement issue in Canada
Similar to China, Canada also has an intensive history of dam construction. It is
now the second largest hydroelectricity producer in the world. It is home to some of the
largest and most powerful hydro power facilities in the world (International Water Power
& Dam Construction, 2012). The dams are mainly used to for hydroelectric power
generation, irrigation and flood control. The first large-scale dam building began during
Second World War, when governments initiated a broad hydroelectric program
(Evenden, 2009). Today there are approximately 450 hydroelectric power plants
operating in Canada and more than 200 small hydro plants (<10 MW). Canada also has
more than 800 dams that are used for hydroelectric power generation, irrigation and
flood control (International Water Power & Dam Construction, 2012). However, quite
different from China, the relocation issue in Canada has frequently involved First Nations
mainly due to historical and environmental factors. Historically, the geographical
displacement of aboriginal group resulted from the invasion of incoming Europeans
since the 1600s and 1700s. Aboriginal people had to abandon their traditional hunting,
fishing and residential lands. Their homelands were restricted through land purchase
agreements, the treaty-making process and the establishment of reserves (Report of the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996).
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In more recent times, the displacement of Aboriginal people has often taken the
form of deliberate initiatives by governments to move particular Aboriginal communities
for administrative or development purposes (Report of the Royal Commission on
Aboriginal People, 1996). Administrative resettlement means the resettlement of
aboriginals for the purpose of government administration, usually to facilitate the
operation of government in order to provide the growing number of social services and
program or to reduce cost of administration.

Aside from administrative resettlement, aboriginals have also made way for other
national development policies, including hydroelectric projects. Resettlement induced by
hydro dams began during Second World War, when demand for hydro electricity had
largely increased. Those dams flooded aboriginal lands and fundamentally changed or
destroyed the people’s economy in the affected area. The scale of resettlement in terms
of affected population in Canada, however, can’t be remotely comparable to those in
China. Normally, the number of resettled population in China for a single project would at
least involve tens of thousands of people. However, as one of the least densely
populated countries, in Canada, a number of around a thousand people would be
considered to be a large-scale resettlement project. Thus, in Canada, it’s hard or even
impossible to find a project that would relocate as many people as that in China. One
has to admit that the scale of resettlement program does place some weight on the
practices and outcomes of the resettlement program. But the point of this paper is not so
much around the number of people affected in hydroelectric projects, but around the
series of political practices and approaches of the resettlement process. For example, in
1950s, Alcan’s Kemano hydroproject led to the relocation of approximately 200 people
who had been living in the flooded area for centuries (Report of the Royal Commission
on Aboriginal People, 1996). In Manitoba, the Churchill-Nelson project led to the

relocation of 450 persons and the Grand Rapids project displaced about 1250 people
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(Martin, 1998; Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996). This resettlement has
nevertheless been discussed and served as past experience for future practices.
However, the small number of people affected doesn’t make the issue any less
significant.
Past practices concerning the resettlement of aboriginals were considered to lack
consultation, although there were certain levels of negotiation before relocation plans
were implemented. The decision making was dominated by the government. Abuses of
authority and power are other problems that have been broadly criticized. Besides,
coercion was also a characteristic in early population transfer activities. They were
considered inhumane and were against the international human rights norms, especially
those before 1978, when Canadian Human Rights Commission updated specific terms
with respect to relocation (Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996).
Unsurprisingly, findings of impacts of past resettlement suggested that affected
communities became less self-sufficient economically and their social fabric was
severely destructed (Coffee 1992; Foley & Hamm, 1992; Martin & Hoffman, 2008;
Wertman, 1983). Before resettlement, aboriginals seldom needed financial assistance
from the government. However, after resettlement most of them need assistance from
government, which caused them to live on welfare. The overall impacts of resettlement
on aboriginals include declining health, reduced economic opportunities, increased
dependence on government and cultural disintegration (Report of the Royal Commission
on Aboriginal People, 1996).
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A Case study of Hydroelectric Projects-induced Resettlement among James Bay
Cree
Introduction of James Bay Hydroelectric projects and Cree Bands
In 1972, the Province of Quebec and Hydro Quebec first announced their
intention to initiate the James Bay Hydroelectric development project (Wertman, 1983).
Since then, the indigenous people of the area, the James Bay Cree and the northern
Quebec Inuit, began an involvement in a complex negotiating process. The James Bay
hydro project is large and multi-faceted. Located in northern Quebec about 1,000 km
north of Montreal, the southern end of Hudson Bay in eastern Canada, bordering the
provinces of Quebec and Ontario, the first part of the hydro development (called La

Grande Complex, Phase I) consists of five large and shallow reservoirs (LG2, LG3, LG4,
Opinaca, Caniapiscau) and three power generating stations (Ma, Hipel, & De, 2005).
Two of the reservoirs serve the purpose of diverting waters from two additional
watersheds into the La Grande River. In 1985, Phase I of the project was completed.
The first phase of the La Grande project resulted in three power stations being
constructed that are capable of generating 10 282 MW of power at a cost of CAN$13.8
billion (Coffee, 1992; Foley & Hamm, 1992). Phase II of La Grande Complex, which
serves to tap some of the remaining potential along the La Grande, has been under
construction since about 1987 by Hydro- Québec. In total, eight generating stations were
constructed in the two phases which produced more than half of Québec's hydroelectric
power. The plan also included the construction of five more power plants with an
installed capacity of 3516 MW (Ma, et al, 2005). The entire James Bay project includes
the La Grande project (James Bay I), the Great Whale project (James Bay II) and the
NBR project (project on the Nottaway, Broadback, and Rupert rivers). For the Québec
government, constructing such massive scale of hydroelectric project is economicdriven. Specifically, the hydroelectric project would create tens of thousands of jobs and
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create a new trade base for Québec in having surplus power for export. However, more
and more groups and individuals are against further development in this area due to its
adverse environmental impacts and devastating destruction to the Cree communities it
would bring. And the massive government-sponsored hydroelectric development led to
great and intense conflict between the Cree Bands (Cree and Inuit Indian tribes) and

Canadian Government, Hydro-Qubec and other NGO groups, which will be discussed in
detail later in this section.
The James Bay Cree region lies to the east and southeast of James Bay. [The
Eastern] Cree have lived there since the glaciers left about 9,000 years ago (Foggin &
Foggin, 2008). It is the home to Cree and Inuit. At the time of announcing the initiative of
constructing number of dams and power stations, there were eight different communities
within the James Bay Crees, who have lived on their lands and formed their unique way
of living for generations. The construction of the massive hydroelectric project was likely
to flood as much as 8800 square kilometers of land, which was a part of the territory
upon which they engaged in their traditional pursuits of hunting, fishing, and trapping-in
short, their subsistence base (Wertman, 1983). The projects have or will cause either
flooding or serious erosion of the land on which several communities are situated
requiring the relocation of these communities. Since the Crees and Inuit are dependent
on fish for living and employment, the exploiting of their communities would bring radical
negative impact on their traditional way of life. Consequently, the controversies around
the construction of series of hydroelectric projects include the effect on the Aboriginal
population and the environment. This paper will specifically focus on the effect on the
Aboriginal population with respect to the resettlement issue.

Resettlement Program
The resettlement issue of James Bay Crees induced by the construction of

massive hydroelectric projects is one of the issues among all of the negotiation issues
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between James Bay Crees and the Canadian government over the last three decades
when the construction of hydro dams took place. The James Bay Cree have been
struggling to cope with major dislocations of their traditional hunting and trapping areas
over the past 30 years (Foggin & Foggin, 2008). The number of Aboriginals affected is
estimated to be a few thousands of people. But there’s no exact figure as to the exact
number of people being resettled. Among all the relocation programs, the most typical
one is the Fort George Relocation (Cree Nation of Chisasibi, 2006). It is one of the
village, called Fort George, with a population of 2373, at the mouth of La Grande Rivière
was uprooted and relocated upstream during the first phase of construction, with over
200 houses being physically moved. Since the purpose of this paper is to compare the
practices and approaches that China and Canada each pursue with respect to similar
issues from a political lens and there’s no exact number of affected population recorded
to my best knowledge (even if they do, as aforementioned, the scale of affected
population in Canada can’t be comparable to those in China), thus, the main emphasis
will be around how they reached the resettlement decision and how this issue was dealt
with on the Canadian part of this paper.

Political Principles, Standards and Approaches of Resettlement
In Canada, issues relating to Aboriginals are usually handled by signing treaties
and agreements between Aboriginal communities and the provincial and federal
governments after negotiation. Concerning involuntary resettlement issues, through
agreement, aboriginal people gained monetary compensation as well as land, although
some groups gained more money and land than others. Usually those parties sign
agreements that list all the aspects and provisions such as: compensation packages,
mechanism for internalization of the socio-economic and environmental costs associated

with large-scale projects, comprehensive community planning and etc. of the planned
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hydroelectric projects (Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996).
Therefore, the resettlement issue in Canada is closely related to the negotiation process
and outcomes between the Crees and the federal and provincial government. The
resettlement program is more of a result from the debate and negotiation between Crees
and the Canadian government. Consequently, the outcomes of negotiations result partly
from the negotiation skills the involved parties possess. Obviously, the approach of
handling this issue is quite different from those in China. During the construction of
hydroelectric projects in James Bay, the Fort George Relocation Corporation was
formed to handle the relocation and the construction of the present town site through
negotiations between the Crees and the Quebec Government over the James Bay
Power Project (Cree Nation of Chisasibi, 2006). Early in the negotiations the Cree
formed their own political association, the Grand Council of the Cree (of Quebec)
(GCCQ), with the chief and another leader from each community on its Board of
Directors, and an executive group of four regional leaders. The Grand Council took over
organization of the negotiations. However, the Cree people remained the final decisionmakers as to whether to accept the results of the negotiation (Feit, 1995). One of the
most significant agreements that has been signed between the Crees and Canadian
government during this period is doubtless the James Bay and Northern Quebec
Agreement (JBNQA). This agreement was signed on November 11, 1975 by the Cree
and Inuit peoples of Quebec, the James Bay Development Corporation, the James Bay
Energy Corporation and Hydro Quebec (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development
Canada, 2002). JBNQA was the first comprehensive land claim agreement signed in
modern times by Canada and Aboriginal people. In terms of compensation, the Cree and
the Inuit received a total amount of $225 million under the JBNQA (Aboriginal Affairs and
Northern Development Canada, 2002).

Furthermore, according to the Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal
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People (1996), the principles and criteria to relocate in Canada include:
1. the requirement for government to obtain appropriate authority before
proceeding with relocation;

2. the need for the relocatees to give their informed consent to the relocation;

3. the care and skill with which the relocation is planned, carried out and
supervised;
4. the promises made and whether they are kept; and
5. the humaneness of the relocation.
Those principles reflect respect and democracy towards the relocatees rather than
strong political flavor in an effort to reduce the arbitrary exercise of power by
governments. At the same time, Canada has made great efforts to match the
international standards for involuntary resettlement based on human rights of all
persons. The minimum standards, which are consistent with the criteria aforementioned,
for involuntary resettlement are (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada,
2012):
1. Governments must obtain and follow appropriate authority before proceeding
with relocation.
2. The people who are to be moved must give their free and informed consent to
the move and should be participants in decision making concerning the relocation.
3. The relocation must be well planned and implemented and should include

consultation and planning with the host community.
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4. Promises made concerning the relocation should be kept and supported by
adequate resources. In this regard, compensation should be adequate and persons
relocated should have ample opportunity to maintain or improve their standard of living
in the new location.
5. The relocation must be carried out in a humane manner, respecting the rights
of persons in keeping with Canada's international commitments and obligations. In this
regard, persons who are to be relocated should have the opportunity to settle as a group
in one receiving community.
6. Government actions must conform with the government's fiduciary obligations
to Aboriginal peoples.

Political Factors that influence the Resettlement Process
As one of the issues aboriginals fight against the Canadian Government in the
construction of hydroelectric project, Canada’s resettlement process has its special
characteristics due to its unique political system and historical legacy. In order to make it
more comparable so that China can learn some experience from Canada’s side, the
political factors concluded here mainly include the central-local governmental
relationship, the land ownership system and the autonomy of Aboriginals.
First of all, in Canada, the scope of different levels of government responsible for
different issues is very clear. The issues of Aboriginals fall under the jurisdiction of
federal government. Some element of local government may also be involved but is only
limited to provide local services after the agreement is reached between Aboriginals and
the government. Therefore, to deal with involuntary resettlement of Aboriginals is

actually about the relationship between Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals.
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Second, the land, in other words, the property, is usually privately owned in
Canada. However, when it comes to Aboriginal reserves, the land ownership is actually
quite similar to that in China because the land is owned by the community as a whole.
However, this kind of ownership is the reason that when the government expropriates
the land from the Crees, the compensation is extremely large, compared to those in
developing countries because compensation usually covers a wide range of social
services as well as the compensation for land loss. They also have the option to
negotiate the unsettled land rights with the government of Canada. By the time the
James Bay Hydroelectric project was proposed, the Government of Quebec retained the
ownership of the land and had the right to reclaim any part of it. The Government of
Quebec could develop it with the permission of the federal government (Richardson,
1976). As the continuous fighting against the development projects on their lands went
on, Crees gradually made progress and Canada first established policies on Aboriginal
claims in 1973, along with processes and funding for resolving these claims through
negotiation. It is important to note that these are optional processes that provide
Aboriginal groups with an alternative to going to court to resolve their claims (Aboriginal
Affairs and Northern Development Canada, 2012).
Thirdly, a high level of autonomy was seen during the fighting with Canadian
government in an attempt to resist undesirable development within their communities.
The negotiation process is considered a history of fighting for the level of selfgovernance. Aboriginals have the right or choice to go to a court to fight against the
notion of development within their communities. In the fall of 1972, the native people
(Quebec Association of Indians) applied to the Quebec Superior Court for an injunction
to stop all construction in the James. A series of negotiations went on since. Those

negotiations minimize the resettlement scale in some sense.
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Achievements and major problems
The relocation in James Bay Hydroelectric project is usually considered to be a
well organized one that set a good example for other countries in this matter. However,
two major problems need to be addressed here. The first is the imbalance of power
between relocatees and the Canadian government. During the construction of the
hydroelectric projects, officials of federal and provincial governments, often proceeding
in collaboration with non-governmental interests such as the Hudson's Bay Company,
decided that people should move and pressured them to do so, especially in the early
stage. Mostly governments and developers see themselves as having interests contrary
to those of the Aboriginal peoples. The tension between Crees and the governments
cannot be mitigated as long as the context of power imbalances, hostility and contention
doesn’t change.
Another controversy is the cultural dimension. Although the Cree Indians agreed
to a multimillion-dollar compensation settlement, some people inside and outside the
Indian community claim that the agreement led to a loss of the Indian cultural identity.
People’s bonds with each other and their lives in general have been affected such that
they have been forced to change their way of living that they have been leading for
generations. In the name of civilization, modernization and development, Aboriginals
were assimilated by explorers from Europe. The community and social ties loosened.
And they found it hard to keep their traditions, values and culture ever since the dam
was built in their territory. The younger generation no longer has as strong emotional
attachment to their lands as their grandparents do. They don’t know the language well.
They have not acquired good trapping skills. They gradually lost their identity. Their
traditional ways of life were compromised or forever removed as seen by aboriginals

38

(Martin & Hoffman, 2008; Waldram, 1987). The relocation of Aboriginal people is as an
on-going, necessary, and functional step in the continuing process of colonialism that
had begun over a century ago. The Van Ginkel Association report asserted that “the
ultimate solution for every Indian in North America will be to become a member of our
technocratic society and whether this society is perfect or not is irrelevant. There is

simply no choice but to take part in that society, if the individual is to achieve full status.”
As for those displaced by James Bay project (Gutman, 1994), they either ended up
acknowledging the economic and social benefits stemming from a closer integration into
national societies or living on government welfare.
The implementation of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement was
also criticized. Many provisions in the agreement are vague, ambiguous and open to
differing interpretations. Besides, the Crees and Inuit both claimed that after the
Agreement was signed, governments began to eliminate or reduce services that they
were entitled to in housing, infrastructure, health and education (Richardson, 1976). The
economic development in the communities was also considered to be a failure although
the objective of the Agreement was to develop these areas.
However, from the standpoint of resettlement practices and approaches, the
achievements outweigh the drawbacks in the experience of James Bay Hydroelectric
project. The most significant achievement is the establishment of the James Bay and
Northern Quebec Agreement, which covers lands claims, environmental and social
protection, economic development, education, hunting, fishing and trapping. The Cree
did benefit from this Agreement. It serves as an important framework for the Canadian
government to deal with issues related to the Natives and for other countries dealing
with similar issues. The negotiation of the resettlement process resulted in a political
socialization and empowerment which will enable the relocated people to defend their

interests more capably in the future. It sets a good example for other countries in
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addressing this issue.

Conclusion
As one of the main reasons that caused population transfers, hydroelectric
projects-induced resettlement have always drawn the attention of academics. Like other
development resettlements, hydro dams were considered to serve the public interest in
exchange for sacrificing the rights and interests of certain groups of people to make way
for infrastructure construction under the name of development, modernization and
industrialization. Large dams, such as the Three Georges Dam in China and the James
Bay Hydroelectric projects are both such examples. The impact of those dam-induced
resettlement can be profound and long-lasting, usually criticized by anthropologists and
environmentalists. Most of the controversies are around the inhuman element, the
adverse social and environmental impact, economic loss and psychological stress to
relocatees. This paper examines two different cases in China and Canada and attempts
to compare the approaches and practices in two different systems and explore what
China can learn from Canada.
Although China and Canada have totally different legal systems, political systems
and cultural legacies, we still found some similarities with respect to involuntary
resettlement.
Both the peasants and Aboriginals uprooted by the construction of dams are
land-based groups who rely heavily on their land as a way of living. Their ties to their
lands are tight both in economic and emotional terms. The issues relating peasants and
Aboriginals in each country are long and ingrained problems for each country. For a long
time, they were both considered to be poor and incapable of making their own decisions.

40

Thus, each group has been marginalized in the process. Both groups had suffered from
economic loss and were worse off after resettlement. The Cree Nation, one of the First
Nations, wanted to escape the cycle of dependency and poverty just like their
counterparts in China do.
The organized resettlement practices in both countries are relatively short,
although the history of dam construction is relatively long. In China, its comprehensive
resettlement practice started in the 1990s. In Canada, the history of Aboriginal
resettlement has also been severely criticized by academics (Hoffman & Martin, 2008;
Richardson, 1976). Richardson (1976) claimed that “strangers” devour the Aboriginal
land with the purpose of economic development in the affected areas. The Cree culture
has been destroyed because “white people” weren’t showing respect to their culture.

Prior to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, Aboriginal reserves had been
constantly invaded by outsiders because the government had only focused on capitalintensive, resource-extractive industries as a way of development.
Clearly, the general democratic or authoritarian character of the state would set a
'climate' for such a controversial issue. The differences between the two countries are
worth more attention. Firstly, although both groups are tied to their lands, issues of
cultural identity are more connected to the land for the Aboriginals of northern Quebec
than for the peasants of the Three Gorges Dam in China. Thus the historical and cultural
legacy has been given more attention in Canada. When I get further into the literature
around issues of relationship between First Nations and Canadian government, I
somehow found that their problem is even tougher than the issue of China’s peasants.
The identity as being Aboriginals and their “society” in Canada certainly has a larger
impact on their lives especially when they have even tighter ties to their communities
and less connections to the “outside” world. They are truly those who have lived where

they live generation after generation. Peasants in remote and backward regions of
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China, however, have always been referred to as one of the “inferior groups”. They have
less social resources that they can take advantage of in order to protect their own
interest. They are normally less educated. What separates them from aboriginals is that
they fight to change their social and economic status. Nobody wants to be poor and
belittled peasants who suffer from generational poverty. Another point is the conflict of
interest between pro-development party and the against-development party. In China,
the interests of peasants are compromised for the sake of development. In Canada, the
governments and developers also tried to persuade Aboriginals to exploit their reserves.
More often than not, the conflicts occur between Aboriginals and the governments and
developers.
Another significant difference is that Aboriginals absolutely have more power and
rights in Canada than peasants do in China. In China, the government tells the peasants
what to do, although they claim peasants will benefit from their actions and it’s for their
good to do what they have been told to do. Whereas in Canada, Aboriginals can use
legal tools to fight against the undesirable developments sponsored by Canadian
government. They can negotiate or just go to court in an attempt to halt the development
projects. In the James Bay Hydroelectric project, the Cree people called for federal
intervention to stop Hydro-Quebec from exploiting their lands (Richardson, 1976). One
way or the other, they acquire more power and rights to protect their interests. More
often than not, they did succeed to some extent to protect their own communities.
What’s more, aboriginals have their own group that represents their interests in
negotiating with the federal government, which is more experienced and sophisticated at
the negotiation table. The form of negotiation is no doubt more just and fair. Through
negotiations, both parties can reach agreement on specific terms, such as compensation

package, future development, etc. Negotiations can be considered as a form of
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participation in the decision making process of such issues and a way of expressing its
needs and wants. Whereas in China, no such thing exists. The only participation they
have been involved in the resettlement process is some meetings held by local
government informing them the benefits they would gain from the project.
Both countries have taken totally different approaches in addressing this problem.
In Canada, groups can file claim in courts if they oppose the proposal of dam
construction on their lands. And they have their own organization, such as Grand
Council of the Cree to fight against the government. In China, people don’t really have
such choice until the “Xinfang”, a complaint system, was being used to monitor the
practices of government mentioned earlier. As addressed earlier, economic development
and modernization are the priorities of the state. Some people have to make way for
those development projects for public good. Above all, for Chinese peasants, it’s almost
impossible to pursue such an approach to protect their own interests. They don’t have
an group to represent their interests and negotiate with government. They have to
accept what would come to them. They are less vocal. They mostly fight individually.
They are on their own. And they are powerless.
The land ownership system also plays a role to the outcomes of the
compensation package. In China, land is collectively owned in rural areas and peasants
only have the right to use the land not own it. In Canada, Aboriginal lands are also
owned by the communities instead of owned by individual people. However, most
Chinese peasants ended up receiving thousands of dollars while the Crees received
tens of millions dollars as a result of resettlement. A major reason is because the
compensation that Crees received is a whole package that covers not only the
compensation for the loss of land, but also the overall development of the area, such as
education, economic development, etc.
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The authority of government in China is less questioned than that in Canada. The
approval of dam construction and resettlement decision takes much longer time than it
does in China. Besides, the sources of funding are also different. In China, the main
funding source for dams is from the central government; while in Canada, there are
several sources for dam construction, including federal, provincial, in early days, local
government all grant money for damming.
The central-local governmental relationship also plays a role. In Canada, the
relationship tends to be less hierarchical. In China, as discussed earlier, government is
hierarchical but the power is devolved. Regulations come down from the central
government and local governments are responsible for the implementation. This may
lead to the loose implementation and great autonomy of local government, which is one
of reasons of corruption and lack of accountability. However, in Canada, there is a much
more clear boundary as to what issues fall under the jurisdiction of federal/ provincial
government or local government. This makes a big difference in the accountability
structure and the outcomes of implementation. Clear accountability structures facilitate
the responsible and strict implementation of regulations and agreements.
From Canada’s experience, we can learn that the balance of power and the
allocation of social and economic resources are important for a just society and in any
issues that involve conflicts of interest. The Chinese government, especially the central
government, should learn to empower its citizens rather than control them and centralize
resources and power, especially if it wants to build a harmonious society. Transparency
and accountability and efficiency quality of service delivery can never be stressed
enough in governmental practice. Defining priorities of the served communities is also
crucial. Citizen participation and efficient mechanisms for communication, instead of just
providing information, should be required for the Chinese government. The peasants, on

the hand, should learn to acquire some kind of political skills which will enable them to
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represent their own interests themselves in the future.
Involuntary resettlement remains a tough issue for human being. But some
suggestions that help make the process less inhumane and more justifiable include
equality, adequate compensation, respect, and implementation of the terms of the
agreement. No matter what measures or approaches have been taken or will be taken,
the goal should be to assist peasants and first nations for a more just and promising
future. Both the outcomes should reflect some aspect of protecting and respecting
human rights, their traditions and the land where they used to live as well as to improve
their quality of life and build harmonious relationship among the different parties. One
ideal situation is to maintain their traditions as much as possible and develop new
approaches for development, although it seems impossible to both maintain their old
ways of living and develop those projects that would be beneficial for the society
economically. But one thing for sure is that, if neither side is to compromise, the less
powerful side is going to lose and the whole society is also going to pay for it.
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